WORKING DRAFT · pre-launch

Easy Budget

AI-native production budgeting for commercial line producers, by Seven Eight Nine.

Prepared for
Jesse · Adam · Nak
Date
August 2026
Author
Daniel Grossman
Live at
7eight9.com
Where we are · August 2026
167
commits · 310 unit tests
product built May 6 → Jul 12, 2026
9
external producers surveyed
8 fully independent · GX asks ~20
3.4/5
satisfaction with current tools
zero promoters across the sample
40.0%
labour share of a budget
measured from a real AICP budget
6 / 11
jobs awarded · change orders
founder's own company, real jobs
$0
revenue to date
billing built, deliberately switched off
Cover letter

For Jesse, Adam & Nak —

Easy Budget is an AI-native budgeting platform for commercial line producers — and the budget is the front door to the operating system for production. Every dollar of a commercial job is decided at the bid: who gets hired, what they are paid, what gets insured, what the client is charged. Own that moment and you are upstream of everything that follows it.

The problem: building an AICP bid takes a producer about five hours inside a macro-locked Excel workbook that crashes. Producers bid roughly four budgets a month and win about one in five, so most of that work goes into jobs that never happen. They describe it themselves — "It crashes sometimes." "Visual Basic Errors." "Feels dated and clunky."

Our solution: you talk to an agent that populates the budget and asks the questions back — then holds the job through its whole life: estimate, award, running, actuals, final cost report. Five hours becomes thirty minutes.

Everyone wants it because the dissatisfaction already exists. Nine producers surveyed rate their current tools 3.4 out of 5 with no promoters — and nine of the ten features they most want are already shipped. The product is live in beta at 7eight9.com; Adam and Nak already have accounts.

Users + data = profit. Getting the professionals who oversee the billions of dollars moving through the advertising production economy onto one platform is the valuable thing. The tools they need today fund the construction of that platform. Being the platform is what lets us anticipate and build the tools they will need tomorrow.

The economics are not the software, and that is deliberate. Producers told us plainly they will pay under $15 a month — so the subscription stays cheap forever. One producer wins ten jobs a year at ~$150K; crew labour is 40% of a commercial budget; at a 1.49% payroll handling rate that producer's job flow is worth ~$8,940 a year against $1,000 for the seat. Inference costs us $0.07 a budget — a 97% gross margin. The budget is the wedge. Payroll and insurance are the business.

The comparables are not software companies. ServiceTitan (the trades — $685M revenue, a quarter of it usage-based fintech) and Toast (restaurants — $2B+ ARR across 156,000 locations) each began inside one workflow of a fragmented, unglamorous industry and became its system of record. Both were founded by people who had done the work. And their switching costs are operational rather than financial: once the system runs the money, replacing it means retraining everyone and migrating years of job history.

We stand up the org on a product that already exists — 167 commits, 310 tests, the full production lifecycle live in beta — distributed through a twenty-year network: 100+ producers, founder-level relationships at four production and post companies, and the producers we hire today for brands including Coca-Cola and Adobe.

It's the right business for me because I have been the customer for twenty years. I have built these budgets, lost weekends to them, and watched what happens when a number is wrong in front of a client. In two years that is ~$2M EBITDA — on $3.3M of revenue with five people if we rent the payroll operation, or $7.2M with twenty if we own it. That choice is the biggest one in this business, and it is the first thing I want your help on. In five, a production machine that turns an EP, a line producer, a production manager and a coordinator into two people.

— Daniel Grossman · Founder, Seven Eight Nine · August 2026

Question 1InsightComplete

What is it?

Easy Budget uses AI to replace producing time. It lets a commercial producer build, award and track an AICP budget through the whole life of a job — bid to wrap to final cost report — cutting the work from about five hours to about thirty minutes.

Category — deliberately two-sided. Capturing existing spend: AI-disrupted production budgeting, taking the Hot Budget seat producers already pay for and delivering it in the cloud instead of a macro-locked single-seat workbook. Creating new demand: agencies and brands scoping work can talk to a trained agent to project costs and budget outbound RFPs — buyers who do not budget today, because existing tools require a producer to drive them.

Customer sequence. Customer 0 is the freelance commercial line producer. The ultimate customers are agencies and production companies. Long term: anyone with complex production to budget and spend to manage.

Gap · No metaphor yet

GX says a forced metaphor is worse than none. We have not earned one, so there isn't one.

Question 2InsightComplete

Who's the customer, and what do we know that others don't?

ICP. Commercial line producers — the person who builds and owns the bid. National spots, socials, photoshoots and web content; explicitly not indie or documentary. Early users budget up to ~$1.5M a job. They range from freelancers bidding regionally in Dallas or Nashville to producers running jobs for Biscuit and Prettybird.

Trigger. The incumbent fails mid-bid. Hot Budget crashes; the segment is already migrating, which is why Saturation.io is gaining traction. We are not creating dissatisfaction — we are redirecting it.

Knowledge edge. Twenty years as a producer of broadcast commercials, socials and features, and a veteran partner at multiple regional and national commercial production companies. I have been the ICP for two decades. I also know the industry's referral topology — which producers get hired by which companies — so we target the node, not the leaf. And the incumbent's failure modes are documented, not remembered: a full Hot Budget teardown (May 2026) with a feature inventory, a calc-logic reverse-engineering of fringe base, markup stacking and overtime tiers, and a scored AI-opportunity backlog.

Distribution edge. Founder-level relationships at Softspot, Smuggler, Directors Bureau and post house Cabin Edit. 100+ producers in the personal network. The producers we hire today to make work for brands including Coca-Cola and Adobe. Beta users include Maddie Clarke (founder, YadaYada) and Micah Ross (founder, Arden Productions).

Proof the channel is live

A survey put into this network on 28 August returned six detailed responses from named EPs and producers at Ride Also, Common Deer, Imposter and PIFF within 48 hours — one of them a 300-word product brief with an offer to get on a call.

Gap · The ceiling, stated honestly

There is no channel beyond the personal network — no producer community, payroll-house partnership, AICP relationship or content engine. Distribution today is founder-shaped and single-threaded. It plausibly reaches the first 50 customers and does not obviously reach the next 500.

Gap · Not yet asked

None of the four founder-level relationships has been asked to commit. Converting one to a recorded "yes, if it does X" is the highest-value call available.

Question 3InsightComplete

What's the white space?

Why doesn't this exist already? Two reasons that compound.

01 · The economics never justified it. Commercial production and post is a $5B+ US industry — large enough to matter to an operator, far too small to interest a company optimising for venture-scale returns. So the market leader is a macro-locked Excel workbook, and nobody rebuilt it.

02 · Nobody else sees the full opportunity. The prize is not budgeting software. It is replacing producer labour and getting paid for the result — then owning the relationship with the deciders who run a very large number of very small companies, and selling them payroll and insurance. Priced as a budgeting tool the market looks too small to bother with. Priced as labour replacement plus a services funnel, it is a real business.

AlternativeWhy it fails the producer
Hot Budget 3 — market leaderMacro-locked single-seat Excel workbook. Crashes. No cloud, no collaboration, no AI. Users say so themselves: "Visual Basic Errors", "being locked into an excel sandbox".
Saturation.io — live threatSplit across docs, feature narrative and commercials. A non-AI product retrofitting AI rather than an AI-first harness. ~4× our price.
Showbiz BudgetingFilm/TV desktop era; not built for the commercial AICP bidding workflow.
Movie MagicSame era. We struck import for it deliberately.
Google Sheets — the real "do nothing"Chosen for price and access, not fit. "Subscriptions that not everyone has… we often move into Google Sheets. That gives everyone real-time access, but it also means custom-building formulas, views, permissions and reporting tools each time."

The wedge against Saturation is focus. Easy Budget does just commercials. That constraint is the advantage: one clean tool built perfectly for one job, against a competitor splitting attention three ways. Switching cost is already lowered — Saturation JSON import is built, so their users can leave with their data.

What happens to the gap. It closes if an incumbent ships credible AI, on a clock of roughly 18–36 months. The defence is speed and compounding data: AI-first architecture is a head start rather than a feature; real bidding data makes the agent progressively better at bidding, running and actualising; and founder-level distribution locks the corridor before a competitor reaches it. This is a speed bet and we say so.

Competitive finding we are not hiding

Saturation Pay already exists — contractor and vendor payments, ACH/wire, QuickBooks sync. On the payments axis they are ahead of us, not behind. Our answer: payments are not payroll. Production payroll — union signatory status, timecards, fringes, W2 versus loan-out, workers' comp — is the hard, regulated, defensible part, and it is where Wrapbook's valuation actually came from.

Job to be doneWhere the hours go todayAI / Labor+AI / Never
Initial budget creation — from scratch or hacking down an old oneThe big oneAI — agent interview populates the budget
Re-key bid assumptions across detail pages~10 min × 5 usesAI
Clone a shoot day and bump to overtime~15 min × 3 usesAI
Look up union / rate-card figures externally~8 min × 6 usesAI — "the constant work of finding accurate, updated union rates, which change annually"
Hand-check topsheet totals before agency send~12 min × 2 usesAI
Formula checking and repairUnmeasuredAI — "requiring consistent formula checking all the time!"
Judgment: what the job actually needs, client negotiationNever — stays human
Gap · The work-map is incomplete

About 2.8 of the ~5 hours are logged with time estimates. The remainder — chiefly initial budget creation and revision rounds — has not been measured. And the timings that exist were recorded by the founder, in three sessions. No third party has timed this.

Question 4InsightComplete

Why now — and how big?

Why now, two legs. The AI leg: an agent can now interview a producer and populate a structured AICP budget, and read a messy existing one. That was not possible on prior models at prior prices. The stronger leg is non-AI: the incumbent is actively failing and the migration has already started. Saturation's traction is the proof that producers will switch. The window is the migration, and it is open now.

$5B+
US commercial production & post
85%
of nationally aired US commercials are AICP members' work
~$150K
average awarded job
40.0%
crew labour share, measured

Source: AICP. Labour share measured from a real AICP budget in our own sample set ($140,000 grand total; A+B+G+O = $56,044 = 40.0%).

The simple math, checkable in your head. One producer wins ten jobs a year at ~$150K = $1.5M of production. Crew wages at 40% = $600K. At a 1.49% payroll handling rate that producer's job flow is worth ~$8,940 a year in payroll fees — against $1,000 a year for the software seat. The attach is worth roughly nine times the subscription.

Our own network, fully converted: 100 producers × 10 jobs × $150K = $150M of production handled → payroll $894K + insurance $120K + seats $100K ≈ $1.1M a year from the personal network alone.

How big — sized bottoms-up, two markets not one.

SegmentUS people
Career commercial LPs — predominantly commercials and branded content2,000–3,000
LPs splitting time across commercials, music videos, docs, promos1,000–1,500
Working commercial LP universe — the wedge buyer~3,000–4,500 (base case ~3,500; ~5,000 aggressive)
Broader group controlling budgets, payroll or insurance on commercial shoots — EPs, heads of production, production supervisors, owner/producers10,000–15,000+

Why ~3,500 is defensible. AICP represents 400+ production and post companies responsible for roughly 80–85% of nationally aired US motion-image advertising, in a $5B+ industry. An AICP industry survey puts responding companies at an average of 33 commercial productions a year. But AICP captures only the professional core: the Census counts 17,366 employer establishments in Motion Picture and Video Production, a category that explicitly includes television commercials — thousands of smaller shops doing regional advertising, social campaigns, DTC content and agency-direct work sit outside the AICP ecosystem entirely.

The methodological correction that matters

Commercial line producers are unusually freelance-heavy. One LP works for Smuggler one month, PRETTYBIRD the next, then a direct-to-brand job after that. Counting production companies and multiplying by employees badly overstates the market, because the same LP pool circulates among all of them. That is why the LP universe is ~3,500 and not a multiple of 17,366.

MarketCore LP estimate
Los Angeles1,100–1,400
New York700–900
Chicago250–350
Atlanta200–300
Texas — Austin / Dallas200–300
SF / Bay Area150–225
Pacific Northwest100–175
Miami / South Florida100–150
Other US markets500–700
Total3,300–4,500 — reconciles with the top-down ~3,500

LPs travel, so these overlap. The geography is built independently of the segment estimate and lands in the same range, which is the check.

Cross-check against job counts

400 AICP companies × 33 productions a year = 13,200 member productions. Our model — 3,500 LPs winning ~10 jobs each — implies ~35,000 commercial jobs a year in total, putting AICP members at roughly 38% of all commercial jobs by count. That is consistent with 400 AICP members against 17,366 Census establishments, and it is where the remaining uncertainty sits.

Why this is two markets and not one

~3,500 LPs is the wedge. 10,000–15,000 budget-controllers is the platform. Sell a budgeting tool and the buyer is the line producer. Sell the system that runs budgets, payroll and insurance and the buyer becomes anyone who controls that money — EPs, heads of production, owner-producers. The product is the same; the second market is 3–4× the first. That is the expansion, quantified.

Comparable businesses — the pattern we are copying. The right comps are not budgeting tools. They are vertical operating systems for fragmented, unglamorous industries, and they share three traits: they began inside one workflow, they were founded by someone who had done the work, and their revenue eventually came as much from moving money as from selling software.

ComparableWhat it isScaleWhat it tells us
ServiceTitanOperating system for the trades — HVAC, plumbing, electrical$685M revenue, ~$772M ARR; IPO Dec 2024. Mix: 71% subscription · 25% usage-based fintech · 4% servicesThe single most useful data point in this table. A quarter of a public vertical-SaaS company's revenue is the payments attach. That is our thesis, proven at scale, in an industry with the same shape as ours.
ToastOperating system for restaurants — POS, payments, payroll$2B+ ARR across ~156,000 locations~$12,800 per location per yearA real ARPU benchmark for a vertical platform. At Toast-like economics, 1,000 customers ≈ $12.8M and ~1,950 ≈ $25M — which is the 2031 target, and a far smaller customer count than seat pricing implies.
WrapbookProduction payroll — our own industry~$1B valuationProof the payroll layer in production specifically is worth a billion dollars, built by people who did not own the budget. We would come at it from upstream.
Saturation.ioDirect competitor; budgeting plus Saturation PayPro $32/mo · Team $79/moAlready building the payments attach. Ahead of us on payments, behind on AI, and split across three markets.
Hot Budget 3The incumbent we displace~$100/yr per Mac installThe price anchor and the reason the migration is already happening.
The moat these businesses actually have

Switching costs become operational rather than financial. Once the system runs scheduling, invoicing, dispatch, payroll and customer communication, replacing it means retraining everyone and migrating years of job history — nobody switches over a subscription price. And nearly every one of these companies was founded by someone who worked inside the industry first. That is the lever we can move, and it is the one we already hold.

Question 5VisionComplete

Show, don't tell.

The product is live and real. 167 commits between 6 May and 12 July 2026. 310 unit tests. 25 database migrations, all in production. Next.js, Supabase, Anthropic. In beta at 7eight9.com.

What is actually shipped: the AICP 2019 builder with inline grid editing and drag-reorder; AI Quick Start and budget-aware chat with propose-and-undo; import from Showbiz CSV, Saturation JSON and legacy .xls; PDF, XLSX and CSV export in two layouts; version snapshots and comparison; client share links; collaborators with row-level security; and the full production lifecycle — estimate → award → running → actual → reconcile → sign-off, with change orders and a job-total rollup.

What the machine does: drafts the budget from a conversation, populates standard line items for the production type, applies fringes and markup, reconciles the topsheet, and flags what is missing. What stays human, permanently: what the job actually needs, the client conversation, and the decision to send it.

Gateway X has already used it

Adam and Nak both have demo accounts, and I walked Nak through the product live on our second call. The demo is not a promise in this application — you have already been inside it.

Gap · The lifecycle is built but barely used

One budget has been wrapped and none signed off. The most sophisticated part of the product has not yet been exercised end to end by a real finished job.

Two weeks from live

The product can go live with real users after about two weeks of testing. That is the gate. If Gateway X wants to help run those tests, we can ship, onboard and grow from there — and that is a specific ask, not a hope.

Question 6VisionComplete

Desired Future State

End of 2027 — ~$2M EBITDA, five people. 500 customers, including five production companies at ~$50M revenue each. Charging real money, priced on value: the land-grab phase ends and monetisation begins. Headcount: five at most — a CTO, and the rest customer service and finance/compliance. Best in class at making small companies capable of servicing big clients the way big companies do — estimates near-immediate, overages near-immediate, producers get their time back.

Five people is a decision, not just a number

At five people the payroll operation has to be rented, not owned — a rev-share with an existing house rather than an in-house payroll business. That puts 2027 at roughly $3.3M revenue and ~$1.8M EBITDA at a 56% margin. Building payroll in-house reaches a similar EBITDA on $7.2M of revenue, but needs around twenty people. See the economics for both columns. The headcount in this DFS has already chosen; the choice should be deliberate.

End of 2031 — a production machine. Not a budgeting company and not a payroll company: a kind of entity not yet seen, where AI does the bulk of the administrative and management work end to end. A job today needs an EP, a line producer, a production manager, a coordinator and often an office PA. Easy Budget turns that team into two people. Budgets self-actualise — data captured as the job moves from estimate to running to actual, pulled directly from card transactions and files rather than re-keyed. The books self-audit. Budgets self-populate payroll and fund the payout when the money is there.

Why the industry will let this happen. Agencies are dying and production companies are changing shape. Directors increasingly want to stay freelance. AI is making more possible. If we build tools working professionals use at scale and speed, we capture a meaningful piece of the industry as it reorganises — and brands will likely use the tool in-house directly, replacing much of what producers and production companies do today.

Two numbers, deliberately

Against GX's frame, the modelled 2031 business is ~$25M revenue at ~$10M EBITDA — about 43% of the total value of the US commercial market at our take rates, and it reconciles to the P&L. $250M is the expansion number, and it requires exactly what is described above: moving past US commercials into film, TV, branded, corporate and brand-in-house production. We state both rather than blur them.

The 2031 number depends on how we price, and I am not going to pretend I know which it is. Three shapes, all from the same product:

2031 shapeRevenueEBITDA @40%
5,000 individual producers @ $1,000/yr$5M$2M
500 organisations @ $10,000/yr$5M$2M
500 organisations @ $100,000/yr — priced on one saved head$50M$20M

Why the third one is the real answer. We are replacing skilled human labour at scale. An agency producer costs around $150,000 loaded. If Easy Budget lets an agency run with two producers doing the work that used to take five, that is roughly $450,000 a year saved. Charging $100,000 — the price of one of the heads saved — leaves the customer $350,000 better off and is an easy conversation.

This is why the ceiling moves

Seat pricing caps out against production spend. Labour-replacement pricing is charged against agency labour budgets — a different and larger pool, not capped by the $5B of commercial production. At 100× the revenue per customer, the expansion required to reach the ambitious end of the range is far smaller than it looks under seat pricing.

What I actually want from a partner here

I don't know which shape this becomes, and I don't want to pretend to know. I want a partner who can see I am going to do this anyway, and who wants to help me think through the smartest way to do it.

Question 7DemandIn progress

Where's the demand?

Read this first — the usage numbers below are a deliberate policy

I have been actively discouraging beta testers from using the product for real budgets until I have more confidence in its accuracy. I use it in the company I own, taking a risk I understand. One bad budget with bad data shared with a client will ruin a producer's reputation — and their reputation is their business. So the founder absorbs that risk, not the network. This is a pre-launch sandbox for exploration, building and growth. The funnel looks the way it looks because that was the decision.

Nine external producers surveyed (eight fully independent), across two waves — May 2026 pre-product, and August 2026. GX asks for about twenty; this is roughly half the bar.

3.4/5
satisfaction with current tools
0
promoters in the sample
5/9
use Hot Budget
4/9
have fallen back to Google Sheets

They name the incumbent's failure themselves:

“It crashes sometimes. Sometimes it's tricky when 2 people look at it at the same time.”

Lars · Producer, Common Deer · 28 Aug 2026

“Visual Basic Errors. Being locked into an excel sandbox. Lack of easy visual side panel displaying all saved versions of a budget in chronological order.”

Connor MacDonald · Producer, Imposter · 28 Aug 2026
Connor bids more than 10 budgets a month.

“Feels dated and clunky at times. Quick revisions, alternate scenarios and comparing versions could be easier, and collaboration isn't as seamless as it should be. There's also a pretty steep learning curve for newer users.”

Adrian Rozas Cristino · Director, PIFF · 29 Aug 2026

“Have to pay for hotbudget every year, not easy to share with those not in the US… Should be a simple excel that anyone can use.”

Sarah Park · Producer · 5 May 2026

The most important finding in the dataset: producers do not ask for AI, they ask for speed. "AI-powered line-item suggestions" ranks last of ten features — 3 of 9. Yet two respondents described exactly what our agent does, without ever using the word:

“Ideally, I'd be able to enter the basic parameters of a project and have the tool generate a strong preliminary budget, including the standard line items for that production type. It could flag expenses I may have overlooked… When rebuilding a budget from scratch, the biggest risk is often not knowing what I've forgotten to account for.”

Matt Benson · Executive Producer · 28 Aug 2026
Matt bids more than 10 budgets a month, and offered to get on a call.

“Smart learnings from past shoots would be great. i.e. last time we budgeted this, we were under/over on these items.”

Alec Carrier · Executive Producer, Ride Also · 28 Aug 2026

So we sell the outcome, not the mechanism. AI-first is our architectural argument against Saturation. It is not the customer promise.

Nine of the ten most-wanted features are already live — version history (8/9), budget templates (8/9), PDF/Excel export (7/9), cost tracking vs actuals (6/9), real-time collaboration (6/9), cloud sync (6/9), client-facing share (5/9), mobile (4/9), AI suggestions (3/9). The one exception is integrated scheduling (4/9), which we have not built.

Pricing evidence. Six of nine would pay under $15/month; two at $15–30; one at $30–50. Nobody is anywhere near the $83/month that a $1,000-a-year seat implies. That is not a problem with the plan — it is the plan. See the economics.

Usage funnel · production, 29 Aug 2026
Invited21
Onboarded1257%
Built at least one budget838% of invites
Budgets created8267 are mine — deliberate dogfooding
Jobs awarded (estimate locked)6my own company's real commercial jobs
Change orders raised11only happen on live jobs
Repeat user besides me1Cody, my employee — 9 budgets
The funnel GX asked forWhere we are
Interested21 invited · 9 surveyed
Using it on real jobs1 company — mine
Verbal commitnot yet asked
LOI / pre-pay0
Paying0 — billing is built, tested, merged and switched off
Gap · The honest cost of the strategy

The restraint is right and it leaves this section incomplete. There is no third-party willingness-to-pay evidence, and the load-bearing "five hours to thirty minutes" claim has never been measured by anyone but me. Both are consequences of a choice, not of rejection — but they are real.

How we close it — parallel-run, no client risk

Ask three to five producers to re-run a budget they have already delivered through Easy Budget and compare. Nothing new goes in front of a client, so there is no reputational exposure. It is simultaneously the accuracy test I need, the timing proof measured by someone other than me, and the transcripts GX asks for. The mechanism is already specified: a Hot Budget .xlsm importer with a provable ±$0.01 accuracy contract and no AI fallback. That plan is what opens the beta.

Question 8BusinessComplete

What are the economics?

Price today is a deliberate land-grab, not a valuation. Solo $10/mo, Studio $15/mo, Agency $79/mo — built in Stripe, never charged. An early user takes real risk on an unproven tool during a live bid; underpricing makes that risk feel like value, and the power gets discovered once they are inside. Narrow margin now is the point.

ProductPrice
Hot Budget 3~$100/yr per Mac install — no free tier, no trial
Saturation Pro$32/mo (~$384/yr)
Saturation Team$79/mo, 3 seats
Easy Budget Solo$100/yr — parity with Hot Budget, ~4× cheaper than Saturation

Where the money actually is. Producers told us they will pay under $15 a month. So the software stays cheap forever, on purpose — and the business is the attach. One producer's ten won jobs a year at ~$150K is $1.5M of production and $600K of crew wages; at 1.49% that is ~$8,940 a year in payroll fees versus $1,000 for the seat.

Cost to serve, measured. The product runs on `claude-sonnet-4-6` at $3 per million input tokens and $15 per million output. Peak usage — June and July 2026 — was under 300,000 tokens a month across the whole beta.

LineAmount
Inference, peak month (all users, all development)~$1.60
Per budget created~$0.07
Per active user per month~$0.20
Revenue per Solo seat per month$8.33
Inference as % of revenue~2.4%
Implied gross margin~97.6%
This number overstates the true cost to serve

Most of that spend is my own development, testing and AI-import experiments — 67 of the 82 budgets are mine. Even at that inflated figure, inference is 2.4% of revenue. Stress-tested at ten times the usage per user and on a frontier model at $5/$25 per million, gross margin still holds near 60%. Inference is not a constraint on this business at any price we might charge.

And the model tier is a floor, not a ceiling

All of that spend was on Sonnet. The tasks in our harness — populating a structured AICP budget, reconciling a topsheet, reading a messy import — do not require frontier models. That means the margin is not exposed to frontier pricing, and it means there is headroom above us: if a task ever justifies a more capable model, we can pay for it out of a 97% margin.

Where the revenue goes — and why 2027 has two possible shapes. Software runs a 97% gross margin, but almost all of the 2027 revenue is payroll, and payroll is an operating business rather than a software line. It carries banking and processing costs, multi-state tax filing, workers'-comp administration, and support headcount. So the revenue number depends entirely on whether we rent that operation or own it.

2027A · Partner for payrollB · Build payroll in-house
Seats$500,000$500,000
Payroll$2,366,000 — our ~40% share of the 1.49%$5,915,000 — full 1.49%
Insurance$397,000 (referral)$794,000
Total revenue$3,263,000$7,209,000
COGS~$326,000 (partner carries processing + compliance)~$1,479,000 (25% of payroll revenue)
Opex5 people + tooling ≈ $1,100,000~20 people + tooling ≈ $3,300,000
EBITDA~$1,837,000 · 56% margin~$2,430,000 · 34% margin
The answer to "where is the missing revenue?"

Nothing is leaking. The gap between $3.3M and $7.2M is not margin lost — it is the payroll operation itself: the staff, compliance and processing you either employ or rent. Both shapes land near $2M EBITDA. A gets there on $3.3M of revenue with five people. B gets there on $7.2M with twenty. And this matters more than it looks: the desired future state already picked one. "Five people at most" is Option A. If we build payroll in-house, the 2027 headcount is wrong by 15 people. That is the single decision that most changes what this company looks like in two years — and it is Gate 4.

Gap · Assumptions that need pressure-testing

The 40% rev-share, the 25% payroll cost-of-revenue, the 50% insurance referral split and the 20-person build headcount are my estimates, not quotes. Kenny Kline built a payroll company and can price the real ones. Until he does, treat the two columns as the shape of the decision rather than its arithmetic.

Payroll is not upside — it is the plan. Without it the two-year target is not reachable. With it, it clears. And the largest dependency in the model is already de-risked: our advisor Kenny Kline built a payroll company and has offered to help.

Gap · No napkin P&L or 12-month model

Blocked on cost-to-serve and a customer-count plan. Not started.

Question 8bBusinessIn progress

How does revenue compound?

01 · Seats, from the beachhead into the firm. A freelance line producer proves it on a job; the production company standardises; team seats follow. The founder-level relationships at Softspot, Smuggler, Directors Bureau and Cabin Edit are firm-level entry points, not individual ones.

02 · The job lifecycle itself. A budget is not a one-time document — estimate, award, running, actual, reconcile, overages. Revenue attaches to the whole life of a job, and the product already ships all of it.

03 · The services funnel — the big one. Easy Budget sits at the exact moment a producer decides what a job costs. That is upstream of production insurance and payroll: large, recurring, high-margin businesses sold today by people who do not know a job exists until after it has been budgeted. Owning the budget means owning the referral. Wrapbook built a ~$1B valuation on production payroll; if we capture payroll for the jobs run through the platform, we can give the budgeting away.

Gap · The attach is unpriced beyond the take rates

We have Wrapbook's 1.49% and a per-policy insurance figure. We do not yet have a named partner, a signed referral arrangement, or a single dollar of attach revenue.

Question 9BusinessComplete

What's the wedge — and how does the model resolve?

The wedge is the bid. The commercial AICP budget, at a price that undercuts the market, for the freelance line producer who owns their own tool choice. Time to value is the same day: a producer talks to the agent and has a draft budget in the first session.

Why this wedge. It is the highest-frequency, highest-pain artefact in a producer's month — four bids a month, five hours each, most for jobs they will not win. It is also the document that everything downstream depends on: the award, the running budget, the actuals, the payroll and the insurance all descend from it. Own the bid and you are upstream of everything.

How the model resolves. Seats never become the business — producers have told us they will not pay software prices. Revenue resolves toward payroll and insurance attach, where one producer is worth ~9× their subscription, and where the customer relationship is already ours because we hold the budget.

Closed doors — what we said no to. Indie and documentary film, deliberately: different workflow, different buyer, no AICP. Movie Magic import, struck. And we are not selling software to bookkeepers-of-production — we own the customer relationship rather than licensing the engine to competitors.

The ramp is a sequence of gates, not a hockey stick. Each gate has a tripwire — a condition that must be true before we spend money on the next one. I am writing it this way because my failure mode is doing everything at once, and because these are exactly the decisions I want Gateway X's judgment on.

GateWhat has to happenTripwire to advance
0 · Accuracy — now → Q4 2026Ship the Hot Budget `.xlsm` importer with a provable ±$0.01 accuracy contract. Roughly two weeks of testing.5 already-delivered budgets reconcile to the cent, parallel-run and timed by producers who are not me. This also finally measures the five-hours-to-thirty-minutes claim.
1 · Willingness to pay — Q4 2026Flip `BILLING_ENABLED`. Stripe is already built, tested and merged.10 producers paying $100/yr. The revenue is trivial — about $1,000. The signal is everything.
2 · Habit — H1 2027Open the beta properly. Onboarding, not just invitations.25 producers each building 3+ budgets a month for 3 consecutive months. This is the retention proof today's funnel does not have.
3 · The firm — 2027Convert one founder-level relationship — Softspot, Smuggler, Directors Bureau or Cabin Edit — from a demo into a deployment.One company standardised, 10+ seats, all bidding running through us.
4 · The attach — 2027–28Payroll live — built or partnered. Kenny Kline advises. Insurance follows. The two shapes differ by 15 people and $4M of revenue at the same EBITDA; this is the decision I most want help gating.The first dollar of payroll fee. This is where EBITDA starts compounding, and nothing before it matters as much.
5 · The price move — 2028From $100/yr toward value pricing on saved headcount.Net revenue retention above 100%, and one customer paying on saved-head logic rather than seat logic.

Where EBITDA actually comes from — the break-even is the whole argument. A fully-converted producer is worth ~$8,940 a year in payroll fees (10 jobs × $150K × 40% labour × 1.49%) against $1,000 for a seat.

Company shapeAnnual opexBreak-even on the attachBreak-even on seats alone
2 people~$300K34 producers3,000 seats
3–4 people~$600K67 producers6,000 seats
5 people — the 2027 DFS headcount~$900K101 producers9,000 seats
Read that as market share — it is the whole strategy

A five-person company breaks even on ~101 producers converted to payroll, or ~9,000 software seats. Against the sized market: • Seats-only break-even needs 257% of the entire US commercial LP universe (~3,500) — literally impossible — or 60–90% of the wider 10,000–15,000 budget-controller population. • The attach needs 2.9% of the LP universe, or 0.7–1.0% of the wider population. And at 100% capture, seats alone top out at $3.5M revenue across all LPs, or $12.5M across all budget-controllers — the first misses the two-year target, the second misses the five-year one. Subscriptions cannot be the business at any capture rate. The attach at 80% of the LP universe is a $25M revenue line, which is exactly the 2031 target.

Stickiness — the comps say operational, and the product is built for it. ServiceTitan and Toast are not defended by price; they are defended by the fact that once a system runs the money, leaving means retraining everyone and migrating years of history. Easy Budget is built the same way on purpose: a budget is not a document here, it is the job's system of record. Once a job is awarded, the estimate is frozen as a contract baseline and the running ledger, change orders and actuals all descend from it. You cannot move a live job to another tool mid-flight. Add payroll and the job's money runs through us too.

Gap · Stickiness is argued, not yet proven

One budget has been wrapped and none signed off — no customer has yet run a job end to end. Gate 2's tripwire is what would prove it, and until then this is a structural argument rather than an observed retention curve.

Question 10TeamComplete

Is this the business you were meant to build?

Twenty years inside the problem. I have produced broadcast commercials, socials and feature films, and been a partner at multiple regional and national commercial production companies. I have built these budgets myself, lost weekends to them, and watched what happens when a number is wrong in front of a client. Easy Budget is the tool I wanted and could not buy.

I am still the customer. My own company's real jobs run through it — six awarded budgets, eleven change orders — because I am willing to carry the accuracy risk myself before I ask anyone else to.

And I have built the apparatus before. Five years ago I moved to Nashville to help an old friend whose production company was contracting. His clients were local and regional. I outlined a plan to go after national brand work, and we won DoorDash as a heavy underdog. Then OpenDoor. That opened an agency relationship that awarded us a national Lululemon campaign — the biggest budget the company had ever seen. I loved closing it and I loved building the machine that delivered it. That is the same job as this one, at a different scale.

Team by archetype

CEO / sales — Daniel, twenty-year network. Product / delivery — Daniel and Cody; Cody is an employee and the only repeat user of the product besides me. Ops / finance — the honest gap, unfilled. Payroll domain — Kenny Kline, advisor, who built a payroll company and made the introduction to Gateway X.

Followership. I am not a social media influencer or a thought leader. I am a reasonably smart person with good values trying to solve a set of problems that make me and some other people rich. But I hold a lot of trust and I have held it a long time: the directors on my roster trust me to represent them well and grow their careers; the producers and crews who work for me trust me to take care of them; the agencies and brands who hire my company trust me to deliver on budget, on schedule, and to give them something to be proud of. I can get a lot of people on the phone, and most people who work with me believe in my potential.

The evidence in this project specifically: Cody gave the beta feedback that became four shipped PRs. Kenny Kline advises for free and made the Gateway introduction. Maddie Clarke (founder, YadaYada) and Micah Ross (founder, Arden Productions) took beta invitations. And when I put a survey into my network in August, six named EPs and producers replied inside 48 hours — one of them with a 300-word product brief and an unprompted offer to get on a call.

When I was crew, my peers used to nominate me to go negotiate with the producers. That is the followership I would point at. Nobody assigned it.

Iteration receipts. Cody's four pieces of feedback each became a shipped PR — autocomplete of common AICP positions, one-click crew copy from prep, adding line items in running and actual, and a dashboard sort that folds shared budgets into one list. I scrapped and rebuilt the entire fringe re-deal model after reviewing my own first version as clunky. And when a producer thought post-production had been dropped from the maths, I audited the whole engine, proved the totals had always been correct, and fixed the cover that was showing fringe twice.

A decision I reversed on evidence. I set out to sell AI. My own demand data says producers rank AI-powered suggestions last of ten features — while describing, in their own words and unprompted, exactly what the agent does. So AI became the architecture argument and speed became the promise. People don't ask for AI. They ask for time.

What has to be true for me to still want to run this in five years: it has to be growing — and I have to still be obsessed with the product. Not obsessed with adding functions. Obsessed with it functioning at a higher and higher level. I want the people who use it to love it, and to want to show it to colleagues and friends, because it genuinely improves their lives and makes their work better and easier. If it becomes software sold to people who don't do the work, I will not want to run it.

The thing I least want to tell you

I have started several businesses that failed, and they failed in part because I was not all in. At one point I was a founder or co-founder of three startups at once. I worked obsessively and tirelessly and it did not matter, because my attention was spread too thin. Two of them died of it. That is the risk I carry into this one, and it compounds with the thing I am best at: persuasion is my strength to the point that it is a weakness. I can sell because I believe — and sometimes my self-belief needs to be checked against the constraints of reality. So: entrepreneurship is not improv. It is not "yes, and…" — not at my phase. It needs to be NO, because. I need to be accountable to be ALL IN on the things I build from here. That is not a closing flourish; it is the specific reason I am asking Gateway X for tranches and tripwires rather than for money.

The business version of the same admission

One person outside my own company has formed a habit with this product, and he works for me. I made that happen on purpose — I would not put an unproven budget in front of someone else's client. But after 167 commits I have a product I trust more than I have customers who use it. Turning that around is the whole job now.

TraitReflection
Compass points northI held twenty-one invited producers back from my own product because one bad budget in front of a client ends a producer's reputation, and their reputation is their business. It cost me the traction that would have made this application easier. I would do it again.
Authentic salesmanI convinced my college administration to grant course credit to students who worked on the newspaper I edited, and later to convert a faculty housing building into a student cooperative so I could live there with my friends. I have persuaded Fortune 100 brands to take a risk on unknown directors, raised money for theatre and film, and talked the owners of a building in Nashville into letting me run a gallery in it for a few weeks. And it is my weakness as much as my strength — I can sell because I believe, and my belief needs checking against reality. That is what I want partners for.
Action-orientedIdea to live beta in ten weeks, alone and while running a production company: 167 commits, 310 unit tests, 25 production migrations, and the full lifecycle from estimate to signed-off cost report.
Doesn't suffer foolsHonestly, I don't recognise myself in that framing. I am a fool. What I do instead is work from first principles and test assumptions — feedback, inventories, replay, watching tape on what we did and what we would do differently. Nothing worth doing has one path; the road from 1 to 10 is non-linear and often means going back to where you came from and trying something else. My job is to find theses I can test in small, controlled environments.
CompetitiveI love to win, and I love to win with a team. Nashville, DoorDash as an underdog, then OpenDoor, then a national Lululemon campaign — the biggest budget that company had ever seen. I will stay up all night and give up comforts and social pleasures in pursuit of a goal, and I have done it over and over. For the modest successes I can claim, I have learned more from the failures.
Relationship-driven, not transactionalTwenty years of a network that still answers: six detailed survey responses from named EPs inside 48 hours, one offering a call I had not asked for. And what I actually liked about the Nashville run was not the closing — it was building the apparatus that delivered the work, and making a real contribution to other people's lives and careers.
Confident, but admits when he doesn't knowI do not know what it costs me to serve one user. I have never measured it. I know what I know and can achieve, and I know what I cannot — which is why the asks in Question 11 are for structure rather than capital.
Takes feedbackAdam told me on one call to think about what I am building beyond SaaS. That single comment is why this application argues for a production machine rather than a better budgeting tool. Cody's four notes became four shipped PRs. My own demand data reversed my positioning.
Question 11TeamComplete

Why build this with Gateway X?

What I want from Gateway X is not capital. This part of the journey is not particularly expensive — the cost to build the MVP can be contained, and it has been. Investment would let me hire out legal and technical work, and that is real. But it is not what I am short of.

I need structure. I have a hardcore work ethic, a network and an idea. What I do not have is a way of organising that effort into strategic tranches, and knowing how to gate what happens when — the tripwires that say this is the moment to open the beta, to move price, to hire, to turn on payroll. Left alone I will keep building, because building is the thing I am good at. That is exactly how I ended up with a product I trust more than I have customers who use it.

You have already done this once

Kenny Kline introduced me to the team. I met Adam and Nak on a call, and had a follow-up with Nak. On that first call Adam pushed me to think about what I am building beyond SaaS — and that single comment is why this application argues for a production machine and a payroll business rather than a better budgeting tool. It reframed the company. I would like more of that.

The thesis it produced: users + data = profit. Getting the professionals who oversee the billions of dollars moving through the advertising production economy onto one platform is the valuable thing. Monetising the construction of that platform through the tools they need today is what funds it — and being the platform is what lets us anticipate and build the tools they will need in an unknown tomorrow.

Adam · product. What to build first and what to refuse. I have shipped nine of the ten features producers asked for and have one repeat user outside my own company — building was never the constraint. The thing standing between me and an open beta is a Hot Budget importer with a provable ±$0.01 accuracy contract; I have specified it and not started it. I want your judgment on whether that is genuinely the unlock, or whether I am engineering my way around an activation problem. And I would like to be talked out of integrated scheduling early rather than halfway in.

Nak · the operating machine. The tranches and the tripwires — that is the ask, and it is the main one. Plus: instrument the funnel properly (I had to write SQL to learn that 21 signed up, 8 built something and 6 jobs were awarded, and I have no cadence for watching it); apply your standard on scorecards and reporting rhythm; and help me design, source and vet the ops-and-finance hire, which is the honest archetype gap in my team. Then the largest strategic decision in the business: payroll, build or partner. Kenny will help on domain. I need help on the decision.

Jesse · GTM and leadership. We have not met yet. When we do: my distribution is a real unfair advantage with a ceiling I can see — 100+ producers, founder-level relationships at four companies, and the producers I hire today for brands including Coca-Cola and Adobe. That reaches the first fifty customers. It does not obviously reach the next five hundred. I need the second channel designed, and I need the monetisation sequenced: producers say they will pay under $15 a month, my model needs $1,000 a seat a year, and the resolution is the attach. What I lack is the trigger and the date.

What I bring. Nobody is positioned as well as I am to build in this space. It is a niche industry with a great deal of money moving through it, and a genuine entry point to capture multiple revenue streams by building an integrated suite of tools that help professionals do their job better, faster and easier. I know the things I know and can achieve, and I know the things I cannot.

I am more interested in mentorship, accountability and thought partners than in capital. I like Adam and Nak. I trust Kenny. That is why I am here rather than raising.